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The nation’s security depends in part on proactive approaches and methods to evolving 
technologies for identifying persons of interest, enemies of state (foreign and domestic), 
potential acts of terrorism, and foreign intelligence. Currently, state and federal entities 
operate passive surveillance technologies with biometrics to identify and curtail national 
security threats, so as to act within the confines of the Act for Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. 
However, such surveillance technologies are implemented independently by state and 
federal agencies, which cause a significant delay in the identification of persons of 
interest. Consequently, acts of terrorism on U.S. soil as well as U.S. assets abroad that 
could have otherwise been prevented may occur. 
This thesis proposes a generic interoperability technology approach that considers 
the networking of public live video streaming with state and federal surveillance 
technologies (including traffic cameras integrated with facial recognition technologies) 
interlinked with the National Criminal Information Center and Federal Terrorist 
Screening Database. Requirements surrounding data format and transmission protocols 
were studied, and concerns regarding existing “need to know” requirements are 
addressed. The interoperability, or systems of systems approach, and concept of operation 
is applied to further the enhancement of and fill a capability gap by providing actionable 
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The use of facial recognition software to automatically identify persons of interest (POI) 
(i.e., an individual wanted by state and federal agencies or a person posing a threat to 
national security) is becoming more commonplace throughout the U.S. As the technology 
of sensors improves in resolution, miniaturization, and color definition as software 
becomes more embedded, smaller in code, more extensible and scalable, and as 
algorithms mature to become more robust and more real-time, the advent of networked 
sensors providing near-real-time facial recognition for decision makers is nearer. 
However, there is a technology gap within the community of law enforcement (LE) and 
decision-makers who want to utilize this technology to share information across domains 
at the federal, state, and local levels of government to identify a person of interest or to 
gain evidence in crime investigation (Baker, 2012). This gap between technology and its 
use is due in part to the accuracy of the current facial recognition capability, the different 
contexts in which the data is used, and the level of trust that is assigned to the data or to 
the user. The adoption of facial recognition technology is hampered in comparison to 
advanced fingerprint technology; facial recognition is not as accurate as the advanced 
finger print capturing technology (Baker, 2012). 
The LE facial recognition process currently in use by some law enforcement 
agencies consists of first taking a picture of a suspect and then matching the photograph 
of that person against a photograph of a registered POI stored in a state or federal 
database. If a match occurs, further action is taken. If no match occurs, the photograph of 
the suspect is discarded or a new record is generated as a POI. This process is dependent 
on the circumstances that caused the suspect to be photographed in the first place. In 
addition, this process currently presents multiple challenges. First, there are time delays 
in the current process between initiating a search and confirming a match. Second, there 
is a disconnection between federal databases and state databases because there is not a 




widespread use. Finally, most of the information provided by these databases is accessed 
after a crime has occurred, as that is when the match process is currently initiated by law 
enforcement.  
There are efforts to reduce the time delay it takes for law enforcement to access 
federal and state databases, but these efforts among all 50 states and all federal agencies 
are not uniform. Currently, state intelligence fusion cells share information and “mug” 
shots of active “wanted” and “felons” via the National Data Exchange (N-DEX). The 
details of N-DEX are discussed in Chapter II. In addition, federal intelligence centers 
share biometric data, but a query must be made by authorized LE officials to initiate this 
data sharing. Federal agencies have security requirements in place that do not allow 
access to all state LE authorities, which complicates matters further. 
While state and federal agencies are making an attempt to improve the data-
sharing processes amongst themselves by building the N-DEX, currently there is no 
widespread sharing of biometric data among these agencies because the network 
infrastructure to support it does not exist. One tragic example and impact of lack of 
information sharing between state and federal agencies was the shooting incident at Ft. 
Hood, Texas on November 5, 2009. The shooter was able to purchase a firearm (which 
requires a state background check) even though he was listed and identified on a federal 
watch list. At the time, the shooter was being investigated by federal authorities due to 
his email correspondence with a known terrorist. However, this information was not 
accessible or available by queries to state law enforcement. Had both state and federal 
agencies used a common database or shared information, this tragedy may have been 
averted by preventing the firearm sale. In August 2010, and in response to this event, 
former Defense Secretary Robert Gates enacted a policy to enable the National Criminal 
Information Center (NCIC) and the federal Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) to share 
information on suspected terrorist threats with civilian agencies and state and local law 
enforcement (Kenyon, 2010). While the policy set forth by Secretary Gates is 
undoubtedly a step in the right direction, the current sharing of data is limited and 
remains passive between state and federal data systems. 
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This thesis proposes guidelines to improve today’s capabilities to interlink live 
video streaming from various sources and compare with biometrics database servers, 
which hold details on state and federal criminals. The integrative approach recommended 
in this research is a system of systems engineering approach to address problems with 
sharing stored biometric data in near-real time between state and federal authorities. 
Using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) facial recognition technologies and with 
established need-to-know, the network access and security issues can be addressed. By 
utilizing active, real-time systems to identify a POI in sensitive areas, law enforcement 
may be able to prevent criminal activities from occurring or shorten the investigative 
process by providing relative and timely information to the investigators.  
This work begins with a background discussion of the use of biometrics and the 
current capabilities at state and federal levels. This discussion points out capability gap 
based on the need for there to be near-real time access to personally identifying 
information, such as facial imagery and biometrics. The aim of the future information 
sharing between law enforcement and the intelligence community (LE/IC) is geared 
toward increasing national security by providing timely and relevant information that will 
help identify persons of interest who are or maybe a threat to either jurisdictional or 
national security. In Chapter II, to facilitate these improvements, the link between LE/IC 
agencies are decomposed into functional relations and then structured as functional flow 
block diagrams to facilitate the flow of data and information between functions (i.e., 
relations and potential synergies). COTS technologies for biometrics, still imagery, and 
live video streaming are discussed in Chapter II.  
Also in Chapter II, a concept of operation (CONOPS) for a proposed solution that 
integrates a network of camera and video systems with a facial recognition system is 
presented. The discussion explores a system where facial recognition software installed 
on a remote server, which monitors live video feeds via the Internet, would be used to 
identify a person of interest that crosses into view of an active public video camera. This 
would create a master database that would be used by the facial recognition system; this 
master database would be an integration of the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information 
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Services (CJIS) databases. Such a proposed system will help track, identify, and catalog 
lifestyle patterns of POIs by recording areas in which the POI has been identified in real-
time.  
Further research is needed to identify the most advanced technologies available to 
implement the proposed CONOPS. The focus of this thesis is to identify capability gaps 
(in terms of interoperability) and to provide a system of systems solution to enhance 
national security by sharing biometric facial recognition data in real-time utilizing 
infrastructures currently in place. 
It should be noted that the widespread networking of biometric technology for 
LE/IC with public video systems may meet with issues in regard to social acceptance of 
the use of such measures, which would result in a lack of support or blocking the efforts 
to stand up such technology nationwide. While outside the scope of this work, a review 
of the Executive Order 12333, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the 
Act for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) was conducted by the author to 
ensure that the approach proposed in this thesis fell within the laws defined in these acts. 
A review of these documents led the author to conclude that the solution presented here 
would enhance national security while maintaining constitutional rights. While a 
thorough discussion of the legal issues surrounding the topics discussed in this thesis was 
out of scope for the present research, the laws relevant to this concept of operation have 
been reviewed here in order to develop a more complete context.  
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Prior to the events of September 11, 2011 (9/11),law enforcement (LE) and 
Intelligence community (IC)authorities responsible for protecting citizens from threats 
against national security were guided by Executive Order 12333 enacted on December 4, 
1981, by President Ronald Reagan, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 
and the National Security Act of 1947. Sharing information prior to 2011 was manpower 
intensive and caused delays for the LE and IC communities to receive relevant and timely 
information. There was no electronic infrastructure to support the automatic and seamless 
sharing of biometric data between state and federal agencies.  
After the events of 9/11, there was an immediate need to enhance and amend the 
aforementioned guiding laws, as they were based on outdated technologies. In order to 
quickly deter future threats, the Act for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. PATRIOT) of 
2001 was signed into law by President George W. Bush. The PATRIOT Act has since 
been extended in 2011 by President Barack H. Obama. In part, the purpose of the act is 
“to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to provide additional 
procedures for authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence information and for 
other purposes” (Protect America Act 2007).  
In addition to 9/11, other national security events have played a role in changing 
responses to acts of terror and other threats. Specifically, a key episode was a shooting 
that occurred at Ft. Hood, Texas in 2009. In reaction to this tragic incident, Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates ordered the creation of a coordinated cyberspace 
counterintelligence policy to better identify military personnel who may pose a security 
threat. The shooter, who was listed on a federal watch list for previous suspicious 
behavior, was able to purchase a firearm without triggering any security alerts. This 
incident was a stark example of the consequences that may occur given a lack of 
coordination between state and federal intelligence information. Particularly, the Gates 
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policy memo notes, “that the services have launched projects to screen personnel who 
appear on law enforcement databases on NCIC and the TTSD” (Kenyon, 2010). Gates 
also endorsed using the Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx) and the 
adoption of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) eGuardian terrorist threat 
reporting system to share information on suspected terrorist threats with civilian agencies 
and state and local law enforcement (Kenyon, 2010). 
Concurrently, the FBI has been overhauling its Automated Fingerprint Identity 
System (AFIS), which currently relies on its agents to input a name of an individual by 
which to search for a possible mug shot match within the 10-million image database. This 
outdated system will be replaced with a nationwide facial recognition system as part of a 
billion dollar Next Generation Identification (NGI) capabilities upgrade. The new facial 
recognition system was piloted in the winter of 2012 in Michigan, Washington, Florida, 
and North Carolina. The FBI will implement the full system nationwide in 2014. While 
clearly an improvement over the current system, this new system retains two legacy 
attributes that inhibit widespread use and efficiency. The first, the design is for a passive 
system, and second, “still” photographs, not live video streaming is planned. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The current state of biometrics facial recognition network capabilities varies at the 
state level. Some states, such as Florida, use facial recognition software, developed by 
L-1, to share images of suspects among sheriff offices and local police departments to 
identify and prosecute hundreds of suspects. Other state law enforcement agencies are 
using software applications installed on smart phones and tablets to quickly take a picture 
of a suspect and perform an immediate, real-time search to see if there is a match to a 
known person of interest (POI) (Steele & Angwin, 2011). The use of biometrics by U.S. 
military personnel abroad to identify persons of interest is similar. Figure 1 depicts an 





Figure 1.  Collecting Biometrics by U.S. Military (from Schultz, 2012) 
This work proposes a solution for the interoperability gap in the application of 
facial recognition technologies to public live video feeds to identify persons of interest 
who pose a threat to national security. The proposed solution also enables information to 
be relayed to relevant LE/IC authorities in a timely manner. This work also presents a 
CONOPS that uses commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) live video feeds along with one of 
several facial recognition technologies working in concert and interlinking with federal 
databases to compare and identify matches of persons of interest for further action. It is 
hoped that this CONOPS (if researched further and tested) could be used to identify a 
POI before a criminal event occurs or alert relevant LE officials that a POI is in their 
area. This solution introduces a proactive use of facial recognition biometrics rather than 
the reactive approach that has been implemented to date. An additional benefit of the 
CONOPS presented here is to guide LE / IC components to invest in developing the 
“interlink gap” since time and money has already been spent by the public on the 
available Internet infrastructure. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
An overview for each chapter is presented below. Each chapter supports the 
previous chapter through applying the systems engineering process. 
1. Chapter I: Introduction. Chapter I introduces the high-level problem this 
thesis addresses and identifies the problem statement that is used as the 
foundation of this document.  
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2. Chapter II: Current Law Enforcement Capabilities. Chapter II presents an 
overview of the federal organizational structure of the IC. The FBI was 
chosen as the primary subject in this discussion: in the FBI’s Criminal 
Justice Information Services Division is advanced in its use of biometric 
database management. Chapter II discusses the national fusion centers at 
the state level, particularly how the various states each take a diversified 
approach in biometric facial recognition crime fighting.  
3. Chapter III: System of Systems Interoperability Approach. Chapter III 
presents the systems of systems (SoS) approach and discusses why the 
interoperability model was chosen as the process for architecting and 
presenting the networked, national security facial recognition system. 
4. Chapter IV: National Security Network Hypothesis. Chapter IV proposes a 
solution to the identified capability gap. The detailed decomposition of an 
interoperability model is presented. A step-by-step description is presented 
that identifies a groundbreaking approach to improving the ability to 
identify persons of interest who are threats to national security. This 
approach also identifies a means to quickly disseminate vital information 
that enables law enforcement authorities to be proactive rather than 
reactive in combating national security threats.  
5. Chapter V: Conclusions and Summary. Chapter V summarizes the 
recommendation for the need for further research to develop a networked 
facial recognition system for the identification of persons of interest in 
close to real time, and touches upon the possible future research for the 
expansion of the system including other identification technologies. In 
addition, this chapter reviews the need and concept for the proposed 
system and the benefits associated with this system. 
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II. CURRENT LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES 
This chapter describes current federal and state systems in place for the 
identification of persons of interest via facial recognition technologies. Of particular 
interest in determining the improvements necessary for the implementation of a network 
to share data and information within the community of law enforcement and decision 
makers is the identification of the requirements for each localized non-networked system. 
In addition, the technology gap is typified by exposing the existing limitations of each 
system and developing the roadmap (s) to provide appropriate levels of interoperability 
for each system. In addition, the current state-of-the-art in COTS facial recognition 
systems and live video streaming are described. 
A. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF BIOMETRICS 
In this section, the current federal LE/IC capabilities in the area of facial 
recognition and how it is used in the defense of national security are described. The FBI’s 
state-of-the-art facilities with regards to biometrics are presented, as the FBI leads the 
way in developing the most sophisticated facial recognition program, parts of which are 
being deployed nationally. The facial recognition system is part of the FBI’s $1 billion 
Next Generation Identification (NGI) program, which is an initiative built around the use 
of biometric data such as facial recognition and more sophisticated finger print analysis. 
In addition, this initiative includes the use of other types of biometric data to identify 
suspects, such as palm prints and tattoos, and potentially even DNA. According to the 
FBI, the biometric technology will be used for: 
1. Identifying fugitives, missing persons, and unknown persons of interest,  
2. Tracking movements to/from critical events,  
3. Conducting automated surveillance at lookout locations (e.g., Occupy 
Wall Street events), and  
4. Verifying mug shots against National Criminal Information Center 
(NCIC) records. (Reardon, 2012) 
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The full NGI program, slated for full completion by 2014, is expected to provide 
faster, more efficient law enforcement. In addition to more efficiently identifying 
criminals after a crime has occurred, the system puts in place technologies that could 
enable enhanced capabilities that could stop offenses before they occur (Reardon, 2012). 
Early tests on limited amounts of data (1.6 million mug shots) have shown the facial 
recognition system component correctly identifies individuals with 92 percent confidence 
rating, and the system is capable of operating on a database with up to 12.8 million mug 
shots (Endler, 2012). 
Since the FBI is not alone in its charge to protect national security, other agencies 
are important to consider in this analysis. There are currently 17 agencies within the IC 
that have some form of national security protection responsibilities. The Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the IC. Figure 2 shows the members of 
the IC and its leadership, and the Appendix provides an overview of their responsibilities.  
 
Figure 2.  Organization of the Director of National Intelligence 




The capabilities of the FBI are detailed in this chapter, as this agency has the 
greatest and most advanced biometric capabilities in the continental U.S. (CONUS). The 
Criminal Justice Information Service (CJIS) is the largest department within the FBI and 
home of the nation’s largest biometric repository. It houses the fingerprints and criminal 
histories for more than 70 million subjects in criminal master files, as well as 34 million 
civil prints (FBI, 2012b). For reference, Error! Reference source not found. illustrates 
an historical timeline of the relevant laws that have governed the use of biometrics from 
the inception of the FBI in 1905 to the present. The Security Act of 1947, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Executive Order (EO) 1333 of 1981, and 
the PATRIOT Act of 2001 (plus revisions) are the operative policy guidelines that form 
the basis for the network sharing concept proposed in this thesis. 
A key design requirement for the proposed network-sharing concept is that it be 
on a flexible architecture that can remain responsive to changes in national policy. That 
flexibility will be ensured by “common access” protocols (CAPs) that determine the 
necessary credentials needed for accessing various types and sources of data and 
information. Those CAPs will be centrally control by the FBI (pick an office or 
designation to lend credibility to this statement) and will comply with the laws and 
guidelines promulgated by national security policy. 
 
 
Figure 3.  FBI Timeline and Relevant Security Acts 
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2. Relevant FBI Offices and Capabilities 
The National Security Branch (NSB) of the CJIS was established on September 
12, 2005, in response to a presidential directive issued by President George W. Bush for a 
national security service that combines the missions, capabilities, and resources of the 
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence elements of the FBI under the 
leadership of a senior FBI official (FBI, 2012d). The NSB’s purpose is to strengthen the 
integration of the FBI’s intelligence and investigative missions. Information collected 
through FBI investigations is analyzed, not just to build a case for prosecution, but for its 
predictive value. In turn, intelligence and gap analysis drives investigative strategies. In 
July 2006, the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Directorate was created within the 
NSB to integrate WMD components previously spread throughout the FBI (FBI, 2012d).  
In addition to managing and maintaining the databases used for national security, 
the CJIS has a number of sophisticated identification capabilities. Relevant to this work is 
the integration of CJIS’s Advanced Fingerprint Identification Technology into the 
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) as part of the NGI 
program. Improvements slated for the IAFIS system include faster and more efficient 
identification processing, increased search accuracy, improved latent processing services, 
and allowing for seamless searches of 10-flat finger print impressions for noncriminal 
justice purposes, such as criminal background checks for employment purposes. 
In addition, the Repository for Individuals of Special Concern (RISC) is a 
national mobile identification system that provides law enforcement and partnering 
agencies with rapid/mobile identification services of FBI most wanted persons, suspected 
terrorists, and sex offenders. The RISC system is optimized to provide very quick access 
to information based on the level of threat that an encountered individual may pose. 





Figure 4.  FBI RISC Process Flow Diagram(from Mayo, 2011) 
The RISC system allows LE to access and share information via the World Wide 
Web in addition to the existing data terminals. Improvements to the RISC system have 
reduced response times by 92 percent for urgent need criminal investigations (reducing a 
two-hour response time to 10 minutes) and 99 percent for urgent civil requests (reducing 
a 24-hour response time to 15 minutes) (FBI, 2012a). The RISC system contains a subset 
of the national fingerprint repository, which is comprised of biographical and fingerprint 
information that is associated with wanted persons, known or suspected terrorists, sex 
offenders, and other identified POI. Currently, the RISC system stores approximately two 
million records (FBI, 2012a). LE can identify a person of interest quickly by the use of a 





addition, local LE can scan a fingerprint from a suspect and within a minute receive 
detailed information about the subject if there is a fingerprint match against a registered 
POI. 
The CJIS is also home for the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which 
provides over 92,000 LE authorities and users with information on over 11.7 million 
active records (FBI, 2012c). The information available for access includes missing, 
wanted, and unidentified persons, as well as particulars on stolen property. Moreover, 
new capabilities added to NCIC in 2011 include a license plate reader (LPR) to assist in 
recording license plates and access to “screen” plates of moving and parked vehicles to 
deter and apprehend vehicle theft offenders. Error! Reference source not found. lists 
the information that is currently available to LE/IC under NCIC (FBI, 2012c).  
 
Personal Records Property Records 
Convicted Sex Offenders Firearms records / loss –missing 
Criminal conviction records Stolen, embezzled counterfeit securities 
Foreign fugitives Stolen property 
Immigration violators Stolen vehicles / boats 
Missing persons  
Parolees or people on supervised release  
Active arrest warrants  
Domestic violence protection orders  
Secret service protective alerts  
Terrorist organizations & memberships  
Unidentified human remains   
Violent gang and organizations  
Table 1.   National Crime Information Center Record Types (after FBI, 2012c) 
While specific records are not available for public viewing, examples of data 
included in these records types are: 
 Vehicle file: records on stolen vehicles, vehicles involved in the 
commission of crimes, or vehicles that may be seized based on federally 
issued court order.  
 Foreign fugitive file: records on persons wanted by another country for a 
crime that would be a felony if it were committed in the United States.  
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 Known or suspected terrorist file: records on known or appropriately 
suspected terrorists in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 6 (HSPD-6).  
Other databases and services that provide law enforcement with near real-time 
data upon request are the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), 
Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx), CJIS Division Intelligence Group 
(CDIG), Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) 
Program. Figure 5 illustrates the complete CJIS infrastructure.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Criminal Justice Information Services Division Capabilities 
(from FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division, 2009) 
The FBI CJIS systems provide data to 18,000 LE agencies and all 50 state 
Department of Corrections agencies. The development of the N-DEx has allowed for 
seamless access to previously segmented data systems, namely the National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC), Interstate Identification Index (III) and the Integrated 
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Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). The NDEx brings together the data 
sources listed on the left of Error! Reference source not found., such as incident and 
case reports, booking, and incarceration data, and parole/probation data from LE 
agencies. This integration of such data has never been available before, and it allows for 
the detection of relationships between people, vehicle, property, location, and crime 
characteristics. Information stored in the N-DEx is searched via an easy to use web-based 
application, which allows subscribed users to specify search terms in flexible ways to 
locate potential matches. It has full text search capabilities (e.g., bike gang Riverdale 
Maryland), as well as the ability to conduct more complicated search queries that take 
into account geospatial information (e.g., nearest to, within a region) and exclusion terms 
(e.g., tattoos NOT Delaware) are supported.  
In special relevance to this work, the system also provides subscription service 
capabilities so that a user can set up a subscription and be notified automatically if certain 
criteria are satisfied. For example, a subscription can be set up to notify a user if a record 
is submitted to N-DEx that matches a specific person. This provides a proof point that the 
automatic notification of match events to disseminate to interested users. This is a 
capability that is a key requirement for the CONOPS proposed in this thesis.  
In March 2004, the FBI created its consolidated terrorist watchlist by merging 
separate watchlists previously created and maintained by a variety of agencies within the 
federal government (FBI, 2009). The watchlist is used by screening personnel at U.S. 
points of entry and by federal, state, and local LE officials. This list serves as a critical 
tool for these personnel by notifying the user of possible encounters with known or 
suspected terrorists and by providing instruction on how to respond to the encounter. The 
watchlist is updated with new information gathered by U.S. intelligence and LE agencies 
(FBI, 2009).  
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3. Watchlist Nomination Process 
As fully described in the U.S. Department of Justice audit report 09-25, May 
2009, the relevant details of the FBI’s terrorist watchlist nomination process is presented 
below. 
According to FBI policy, all subjects of FBI international terrorism investigations 
must be nominated to the consolidated terrorist watchlist, including persons who are 
under preliminarily investigation to determine whether they have a nexus to terrorism. 
FBI policy also states that all known or suspected domestic terrorists who are subjects of 
FBI full investigations must be nominated to the watch list. Under certain circumstances, 
FBI policy also allows for the nomination to the watchlist of known or suspected 
terrorists for whom the FBI does not have an open international terrorism investigation. 
For example, the FBI may obtain information about a known or suspected terrorist 
residing outside of the United States for whom it believes watchlisting is warranted, but 
for whom it has no open terrorism investigation because there is no known nexus to the 
United States.  
Whenever an FBI field office opens a preliminary or full international 
terrorism investigation or a full domestic terrorism investigation, the field 
office must notify certain Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI 
headquarters units of the case opening within 10 working days. One of the 
FBI headquarters’ units that must be notified is the FBI’s Terrorist Review 
and Examination Unit (TREX). TREX is the FBI headquarters unit that 
serves as the processing unit for almost all FBI watchlist nominations 
resulting from open FBI terrorism investigations. In order for TREX to 
process an initial watchlist nomination, the assigned case agent must 
electronically submit copies of the opening electronic communication 
document (which formally opens the case within the FBI), the notice of 
initiation (which formally notifies DOJ of the case opening), and a 
watchlist nomination form. (FBI, 2009, p. 4) 
The same FBI document also explains: 
For both international and domestic terrorist nominations, TREX is 
responsible for reviewing and approving each nomination. TREX’s quality 
assurance review verifies that there is justification for the nomination, that 
the information submitted is complete and accurate, and that the criteria 
are met for inclusion of the subject in downstream databases. (2009, p. 4) 
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The procedure is explained by the 2009 FBI document as: 
Once TREX has reviewed and approved a watchlist nomination, it sends 
the nomination of known or suspected international terrorists to the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) branch, staffed by FBI 
personnel, which reviews the nomination and enters it into its Terrorist 
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database. Each weeknight and 
twice on Fridays, the NCTC performs an electronic export of the known or 
suspected terrorist information in TIDE to the FBI’s Terrorist Screening 
Center (TSC). The TSC then performs one final quality review of the new 
records before importing them into the TSC’s consolidated terrorist 
watchlist, which is also known as the Terrorist Screening Database 
(TSDB). Like the NCTC, the TSC conducts a nightly electronic export of 
the TSDB that sends the watchlist information to the various screening 
databases used by the U.S. government and some of its allies. (pp. 4–5) 
The nomination process for known or suspected domestic terrorists differs slightly 
in that TREX submits these nominations directly to the TSC. The NCTC is not involved 
in the process because its TIDE database is prohibited from containing purely domestic 
terrorism information (FBI, 2009, p. 4).  
Figure 6 illustrates the described enrollment process for a person of interest to be 
included in the terrorist watch list. Typically, it takes up to 20 calendar days (taking into 
account weekends and holidays) to post information on the terrorist watchlist and 
populate that information across all federal LE databases. As indicated in Figure 6, this 
time includes up to 10 working days for the field office work, 24 hours for TREX, 24 





Figure 6.  Terrorist Watch List Nomination Process (from FBI, 2009, p. 13) 
As of September 2008, over 400,000 unique names and over 1,000,000 records 
are contained in the database (FBI, 2009, p. 86). Once a person has been entered into the 
FBI terrorist watchlist system (and therefore tagged as a POI), the POI is typically 
identified in one of three ways:  
1. upon physical sighting of the POI,  
2. through active surveillance, or 
3. via intelligence information collected from the LE or IC. Each of these 
activities require some form of human involvement (i.e., personnel 
actively watching areas for which security is a concern).  
Even when using camera feeds, which allow a single individual to watch multiple 
areas via the monitoring of those feeds, the process is prone to error and the task is 
difficult to maintain for any length of time. In addition, members of the LE/IC 
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community cannot be everywhere at once, which means that some POIs will go 
unnoticed. The introduction of technology that can automatically scan for and identify 
POIs and return match information to appropriate members of the LE/IC community 
could increase detection rates and act as a force multiplier to traditional surveillance 
techniques. That is, automated systems would effectively increase the number of “eyes” 
on a monitored security area or expand the number of areas that could be covered.  
A logical extension to the existing CJIS infrastructure and capabilities is to enable 
an automatic, real-time system to identify POIs based on input from existing security 
video camera feeds. This thesis proposes adapting the infrastructure that is mostly in 
place today to assist LE/IC in identifying POI, including the POI’s location.  
B. STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPOSITION 
In this section, the current state LE/IC capabilities in the area of facial recognition 
is described and how that information is used in the defense of national security through 
collaboration between state and federal agencies. 
In 2003, DHS teamed up with the DOJ to initiate the National Network of Fusion 
Centers across the country (DHS, 2012). The main purpose of these fusion centers was to 
disseminate terrorism threat information from federal law enforcement authorities to state 
and local authorities and law enforcement agencies. DHS set up a system called 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (SNI) to allow state and local law 
authorities to report and respond to counterterrorism activities. The main goal of the SNI 
is to assist participating agencies in adopting compatible processes, policies, and 
standards that foster broader sharing of SARs, while ensuring that privacy and civil 
liberties are protected in accordance with local, state, and federal laws and regulations 
(Fusion Process Catalog of Services 2011).  
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2012) “National 
Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet,” state and major urban area fusion center serve as 
primary locations within the state and local areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and 
sharing of threat-related information among federal, state, and local partners. Fusion 
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centers conduct analyses and facilitate information sharing, and they are owned and 
operated by state and local entities with support from federal partners. These centers are 
uniquely situated to empower frontline personnel to understand the local implications of 
national intelligence by providing tailored, local context to national threat information. 
To date, the 72 existing fusion centers range from less that range in age from than one 
year to 10 years old, with most between four and six years old. They range in size from 
three staff members over 100 staff members in large centers, with an average fusion 
center size of 25 staff members (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011).  
State and local LE/IC authorities are taking proactive steps in sharing biometric 
data. Several states have a dedicated network in pilot stages where all LE/IC officials 
from state police, local city and town police, and county sheriff officers have the ability 
to collaborate and quickly query information from their patrol cars. For example, 
products like eAGENT provide access to criminal justice data from local, federal 
(including the FBI N-DEx data) and interstate data from the mobile data terminals 
installed in patrol units. Moreover, New Mexico, Arkansas, Florida are among the states 
using the eAGENT system (eAGENT Client Mobile, 2012).  
In addition, COPSync is providing similar capabilities to hundreds of municipal 
and county law enforcement agencies in more than 150 of the 254 Texas counties 
(COPSync, 2012). Through a collaborative effort with the state of Michigan, Oakland 
County’s Courts and Law Enforcement Management Information System (CLEMIS) 
participates in Michigan’s Local Government Network, the Michigan Incident Crime 
Reporting database, and Michigan fusion centers to consolidate crime reporting and 
biometric data. Furthermore, CLEMIS makes this data available to all participating 
agencies throughout the state. One of the two key components of the data shared by 
CLEMIS is Mugshots, the CLEMIS biometric imaging system. This system provides the 
public safety community with immediate access to mug shot images and other data (i.e., 
images of scars, distinctive marks, tattoos) through desktop computers, patrol vehicles, or 
wireless devices (Bertolini, 2012). 
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Other states, such as Florida, are using facial recognition technologies to assist in 
capturing local and state fugitives. In Florida, Tampa Police set up cameras at the 
turnstiles at Super Bowl XXXV and took pictures of everyone who entered (Chachere, 
2001). These pictures were screened against a database of known criminals and 
international terrorists. The facial recognition system was loaned to them by Viisage 
Technology (now L-1 Identity Solutions) based in Littleton, Massachusetts (L-1 Identity 
Solutions, 2012). Tampa Police Dept. recorded 19 matches for POI with active warrants 
thus proving the technology works. 
Other state LE/IC departments are using handheld facial recognition systems as 
identified in Error! Reference source not found. (Steele & Angwin, 2011). This system 
allows a police officer to take a picture of a suspect that is then compared against a 
repository of active criminals on wanted lists. A positive ID can result in a quickly 
executed apprehension by the police officer. This operational concept outlines a scenario 
that captures many of the requirements for the front-end stage of the CONOPS proposed 
in this work. Details of these requirements will be discussed in Chapter IV.  
 
 
Figure 7.  Police Processing Suspect with Handheld 
(from Steele & Angwin, 2011) 
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C. COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE RELEVANT TECHNOLOGIES 
This section will discuss the relevant commercially available technologies and 
how they may be used in the defense of national security, namely, facial recognition and 
CCTV systems. Note that section is not an endorsement of any specific company or 
technology, but rather it is a summary of the types and kinds of technologies that are 
available today. Until such time as the government has given authority to an acquisition 
professional to request information from a vendor, information, such as is included in this 
section, suffices to illustrate a general capability. It is outside the scope of this thesis to 
review the state of the art of technologies that are found commercially and that could be 
leveraged and integrated into an active facial recognition system.  
1. Facial Recognition 
The following is a summary of three providers of facial recognition technology 
that illustrate a relatively current technology.  
a. Progeny Systems Corporation 
Progeny’s product, Surveillance, Persistent Observation, and Target Recognition 
(SPOTR), is a biometrics facial recognition system under development that is purported 
to detect, track, and identify non-cooperative targets utilizing a video sensor network 
(SPOTR Corporation, 2013).  
b. West Virginia High Tech Consortium 
West Virginia High Tech Consortium (WVHTC) is developing an advanced 
biometrics facial recognition system called Tactical Analysis of Video Imaging (TAVI) 
with funding from the Office of Naval Research (ONR). First demonstrated at Empire 
Challenge, Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, TAVI is purported to have evolved to enable 
identification of non-cooperative targets through CCTV systems (Advanced Technology 
Group: Tactical Analysis of Video Imagery, 2013).  
20 
 
c. Safran / Morpho Trust (Formerly Viisage) 
As mentioned above, Viisage provided the biometrics software system used in 
Super Bowl XXXV ostensibly to help prevent domestic terrorism. The camera systems 
captured images of ticket holders as people entered the stadium. The images were then 
compared against those of known criminals and international terrorists (Biometrics, 
2013). Although both Progeny System Corporation’s SPOTR and the WVHTC TAVI 
system are currently in research and development (R&D) phases of development, both 
companies are purported to be moving toward ruggedized, deployable systems. 
2. CCTV 
a. Internet Public Live Stream Video 
Opentopia (Free Live Webcams, 2013) Dropcam, Inc. (Public Dropcams, 2013), 
and EGGMAN Technologies (Mobile Surveillance, 2013) all are supposed to provide 
free access to various cameras that have the correct drivers and are connected to the 
Internet. Provided access includes video feeds from public places as well as personal 
camera feeds. These CCTV systems are claimed to be starting to provide HD quality 
imagery, which further increases their usefulness as data feeds for recognition systems. 
b. Traffic Cameras Are Provided by State Department of Transportation 
Websites 
Examples of traffic camera feeds available can be viewed at www.trafficland.com 
or state Department of Transportation (DOT) websites directly. Error! Reference source 
not found. depicts a traffic camera that is viewable from the Virginia State DOT website. 
While currently the quality of video collected by traffic cameras is low, upgrades to HD 
quality video are likely to be rolled out in the future and then these feeds will become a 





Figure 8.  Department of Transportation Camera 
c. Other Private and Government Furnished Sources 
There are many additional video sources that could be used as data feeds for the 
proposed system. To utilize feeds from security cameras at stores, parking garages, 
airports, or and other high threat areas, the video feeds would need to be integrated into a 
secure WAN. Error! Reference source not found. is an example of some security 





Figure 9.  Examples of Other Security Cameras 
D. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS 
In addition to its increased use in the U.S., cataloging biometric data for law 
enforcement purposes is becoming more prevalent internationally. In Australia, the New 
South Wales (NSW) government began recording features for facial recognition purposes 
in 2010, using driver’s license photos (Jones, 2010). At this time, every person who 
walks past a CCTV can be tracked throughout the city. Similar to how it is in the United 
States, in Australia, each state and territory is responsible for maintaining law and order 
within its borders. CrimTrac is the national information sharing service for Australia’s 
police, law enforcement, and national security agencies. It provides services for 
information sharing by partnering with Australia’s police agencies. These partnerships 
enable CrimTrac to provide information to police across state and territory borders. 
Furthermore, CrimTrac has asked NSW for its facial features database so it can be mined 
nationally by police using the facial recognition technology (Jones, 2010). 
E. SUMMARY 
State LE and IC authorities are beginning to share criminal information through 
the advanced capabilities of the FBI’s CJIS. In addition, the LE and IC communities are 
making great strides in the identification and apprehension of suspects with the use of 
shared biometric data, including facial recognition. The FBI’s NGI program has a 
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specific task of integrating facial recognition into its capabilities. NGI Increment 4, slated 
for full deployment in the summer of 2014, includes a new facial recognition system. It 
was initially piloted in February of 2012, providing a search of the national repository of 
photos consisting of criminal mug shots. Currently, this repository contains 
approximately 12.8 million searchable frontal photos (Endler, 2012). The pilot program 
permitted authorized LE agencies to submit queries for a search of the repository of mug 
shots, and the results of the search were returned to the submitting agency as a lead in the 
form of a ranked list of candidate matches.  
In February of 2012, the state of Michigan successfully completed an end-to-end 
Facial Recognition Pilot program and is currently submitting facial recognition searches 
to CJIS (What Facial Recognition, 2012). The pilot program is open to states or agencies 
that already have established facial recognition systems. Hawaii, Maryland, South 
Carolina, Ohio, and New Mexico either already have a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) in place or are engaged in the MOU review process for pilot participation. 
Kansas, Arizona, Tennessee, Nebraska, and Missouri are also interested in pilot 
participation before the full program roll-out in the summer of 2014 (What Facial 
Recognition, 2012).  
The use of this technology, even in the ground breaking NGI system, requires a 
LE official as part of the process. The LE official must gather his/her own photo evidence 
and submit that data via a query to the CJIS system. Typically, this process occurs after a 
crime has been committed. By creating an automated process, the integration of 
networked security camera systems into the process of submitting photos or by streaming 
video automatically to the facial recognition system provides a solution where LE 
officials are alerted of the presence of a POI before a crime is committed. 
The technology to support the automation of the detection of POIs by using 
security camera systems is currently available, both for the facial recognition capabilities 
and for the video capture capabilities. A successful implementation will likely require an 
upgrade to the existing video camera equipment as many of the installations in place 
today are of low quality. However, the feasibility of this approach has already been 
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successfully demonstrated on a smaller scale internationally. In the following chapters, a 
proposal that utilizes much of the existing infrastructure is introduced to include such 
capabilities in CONUS. Figure 10 illustrates how this implementation could augment the 
CJIS current capabilities with the existing capability gap clearly indicated.  
 
 
Figure 10.  CJIS Capabilities Augmented with Proposed Work 
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III. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS INTEROPERABILITY APPROACH 
This chapter introduces the system of systems and interoperability approaches 
adopted in this work. In addition, a discussion of a system of systems’ spiral development 
cycle is suggested for use in the development of the solution. The following chapter 
shows how these approaches relate to the CONOPS proposed in this thesis. There are 
multiple definitions of a system of systems (SoS) engineering approach. Kaplan’s 
definition is one that applies well to this thesis (Kaplan, 2006). This approach is 
summarized as follows: 
A system-of-systems is a large, complex, enduring collection of 
interdependent systems under development over time by multiple 
independent authorities to provide multiple, interdependent capabilities to 
support multiple missions. (Kaplan, 2006, p. 16) 
In addition, the term “interdependent” is defined by Kaplan (2006) as “the senses 
that mission success requires that they work together, and that their features or attributes 
may be traded off against each other” (p. 16). This particular definition of a system of 
system and interdependence is helpful to have in mind for this thesis research. This is 
because in order for the concept of operation that will be presented in this research 
project to work, all required subsystems (e.g., the network infrastructure, camera and live 
video feeds, reporting infrastructure, facial recognition system) of the proposed 
architecture must be interdependent to achieve the goal of identifying a person of interest 
who might pose a threat to national security in near real time. The sum of the subsystems 
in this thesis architecture is large and complex, something that also fits into the definition 
offered by Kaplan. 
In addition to being a SoS, the components of the architecture presented in this 
thesis need to be interoperable. In common terms, interoperability is the process of taking 
diverse systems and enabling them to work in concert. The article “Identifier 




The ability of independent systems to exchange meaningful information 
and initiate actions from each other, in order to operate together to mutual 
benefit. In particular, it envisages the ability for loosely-coupled 
independent systems to be able to collaborate and communicate. (2012) 
A. DEVELOPMENT CYCLE 
Error! Reference source not found. illustrates the system development cycle 
process for a complex system such as the one proposed in this work (i.e., one requiring 
system interoperability). The various components of this process are discussed in detail in 
this chapter. The following chapter discusses how they apply to the implementation of the 
CONOPS presented in this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Cyclical Development Model (after Boehm, 1986) 
1. Requirements. During the requirements phase, system needs are 
identified and clearly defined. Hardware and software specifications are 
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initially defined, stakeholders (lead agencies) are identified, and funding 
requirements and sources are also identified. 
2. Development. During the development phase, working groups are 
established, statements of work are clearly defined for each working 
group, risk analysis is conducted and a preliminary system is developed.  
3. Implement. During the implementation phase, pilot programs are started, 
and system and acceptance testing is completed. Feedback from 
stakeholders is taken into account and the system is modified to ensure the 
system performance meets the stated requirements. 
4. Maintain. During the maintenance phase, the primary stakeholder is 
responsible for the life cycle support throughout the life of the program. 
Training must be established to allow the users to operate the system for 
its intended purpose. Lessons learned are also brought forward during this 
phase to help guide any future related development. 
5. Govern. During the governance phase, the implemented technology is 
monitored to ensure system performance meets the defined requirements, 
governing policy is refined, and life cycle technology updates are defined. 
(Boehm, 1986, p. 14) 
As illustrated by the inner cycle depicted in the development cycle in Error! 
Reference source not found., the impacted technology components include system 
hardware, software, firmware, and the underlying databases and interfaces associated 
with the system implementation. Each of these technological components must be 
considered during each phase of the cycle. For example, requirements must be detailed 
for all required system hardware, software, firmware, databases and interfaces during the 
requirements phase of the cycle. Plans must be put in place to monitor the system 
performance of the facial recognition system implemented during the governance phase 
to ensure the system meets the defined requirements. 
B. SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL 
The cyclical development model introduced in the previous section defines the 
process to be followed as a whole to develop a complex system of systems program. To 
efficiently implement each individual system as well as the integration effort, the spiral 
method is recommended. The spiral method (implemented by the spiral development 
model) was developed by Barry Boehm and provides a risk reducing approach to the 
software development life cycle (Boehm, 1986). The model blends elements of both 
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design and prototyping in stages to combine the advantages of top-down (waterfall) and 
bottom-up (prototyping) models commonly used in systems development. The spiral 
model is intended for large, expensive, and complicated projects, such as that proposed in 
this work. 
The spiral development model is illustrated in Figure 12. Each loop in the spiral 
represents a development phase. Depending on the complexity of the project, there may 
be multiple development phase loops as initial prototypes are further developed and 
evaluated against requirements. Each loop traverses through four quadrants, where the 
following activities take place:  
1. Determine objectives, alternatives, constraints: Regardless of how far we 
are in the development process (i.e., what loop we are on), we must define 
the objectives, determine available alternatives, and assess the constraints 
of the given cycle. This process ensures that we are developing to our 
overall requirements and will stay focused on the important aspects of the 
particular development cycle in which we are engaged. 
2. Evaluate alternatives, identify and resolve risks: At this point in the 
development cycle, we evaluate the alternative solutions identified. Any 
operational or technical issues are identified and addressed here. Risk 
mitigation is defined and documented during this phase of the spiral.  
3. Development: Execution of the objectives for this phase is completed here 
(e.g., software development, hardware implementation, testing).  
4. Plan: This reviews the progress that has been made toward the ultimate 
project requirements and plans the next development spiral accordingly. 
Any issues that are identified are addressed before the next development 
loop begins.  
Subsequent development loops will transverse these four stages and focus on the 
objectives defined for that loop. For example, the first loop through the spiral model will 
often result in a proof of concept prototype. This initial prototype may be run only in a 
controlled or laboratory environment with limited features, but key components of the 
final project can be initially tested. Then, this development loop will expose initial risks 
and identify possible alternatives going forward. Each subsequent development loop will 
build upon the initial loop, bringing the project closer to maturity while still providing 
testable progress along the way.  
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In the model, radial distance is a measure of effort expended, while the angular 
distance measures progress. It combines the basic waterfall building block and 
evolutionary/incremental prototype approaches to software development. The building 
block activities of design architectural preliminary design review (PDR), detailed design, 
critical design review (CDR), code, unit test, integration and test, and qualification test 
are sequentially followed to deliver an initial operational capability (IOC). After IOC, the 
product is reviewed to determine how its operational capability could be enhanced. 
Support and maintenance issues are revisited through risk analysis. The product is 
updated and an operational prototype (s) is demonstrated and validated. The system then 
goes through an updated waterfall development process with final delivery of a full 
operational capability (FOC) product. This type of development approach ensures that 
requirements are defined early and revisited regularly, and risks are identified and 
managed throughout the development lifecycle, as required (Software Technology 
Support Center, 2000). Given the complexity of the system proposed in this thesis, a 
spiral development model will allow for periodic evaluation by all stakeholders. In 
addition, the model facilitates early identification of risk, which is critically important in 







Figure 12.  Interoperability Spiral Development Model (from Langford, 2012) 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter briefly introduced the system of systems concept along with the 
models proposed to implement such a program through a development cycle. In addition, 
it also introduced the spiral development model to specify how the software components 
of such program would be most efficiently implemented.  
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IV. NATIONAL SECURITY NETWORK HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter will describe in detail the concept of operation proposed in this 
thesis. It will also identify general requirements by using the engineering spiral approach 
designed by Barry W. Boehm and introduced in the previous chapter. Finally, this chapter 
will present a simplified architecture for the proposed CONOPS and discuss information 
flow (Eisner, 2008). 
A. SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL 
The research aim of this thesis is to develop a concept of operations that will 
detect persons of interest (POI) in real-time as they pass in front of an active monitoring 
camera such as public cameras on the Internet, DOT traffic cameras, or security cameras 
near high risk areas (i.e., bridges, tunnels, or major events). The integration of primarily 
readily available technologies is proposed in the development of this CONOPS. For the 
purpose of this work, a (POI is a person who poses a threat to national security and who 
is enrolled by the Terrorist Review and Examination Unit(TREX) into the FBI’s 
consolidated terrorist watch list (as described in Chapter II, Error! Reference source not 
found.).  
Integrating the current infrastructure to provide an active ID match of a POI 
requires a system of systems approach to create a robust operability model. In the 
following paragraphs, we apply a spiral approach drawn from Langford (2012), which is 
based on the Boehm model to present the development process from concept to delivery. 
Error! Reference source not found. presents the summary of the spiral approach from a 
project definition to a robust system of systems. The highlighted portion at the center of 






Figure 13.  Addressed Portion of Spiral Model (after Langford, 2012) 
This thesis will address the first spiral (illustrated in the yellow highlighted 
portion of Error! Reference source not found.) and 1) a project definition, 2) a 
conceptual prototype, 3) a concept of operations and 4) an engineering and project plan. 
The thesis will conclude with the system review milestone. Future work would continue 
the project development around the spiral, with regular risk analysis stages to ensure all 
stakeholder requirements are met, requirements have not been overlooked, and the 
project remains on task and on time and budget. The remaining milestones, requirements 
review, design review, and project review, would be performed at the completion of each 
spiral (as illustrated in Error! Reference source not found.).  
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1. Project Definition 
The project definition stage defines the top-level goals of the project. In this stage, 
project objectives, alternatives and constraints are defined.  
2. Project Objectives 
At the highest level, the purpose of the proposed real-time POI identification 
system is to use biometric facial recognition systems to monitor live video feeds from 
publicly accessible cameras, such as DOT traffic cameras, social cameras, and security 
cameras from parking garages, airport terminals, and those set up for major public events, 
to identify POI present in these feeds and alert the appropriate LE authorities to their 
presence. To expand further, facial recognition servers will process live cameras and 
video feeds to determine if a known POI is present. If a POI has been identified by the 
system, an alert will be generated and sent to the appropriate LE authorities for follow-




Figure 14.  Project Definition 
During the project definition phase, we also clearly defined our assumptions to 
drive the development of the conceptual prototype. The assumptions made here are that 




 Receive and process streaming live video 
 Select from active enrollments in an up-to-date, complete LE database 
 Process the image real-time through a facial recognition server 
 Send an alert in a universal metadata format that relevant LE/IC agencies 
can receive 
Moreover, the alert will have security protocols in one of three levels:  
 Level 3 “GREEN” is dispatched to all authorized users with access to 
CJIS systems, 
 Level 2 “YELLOW” will only distribute a general alert to the responsible 
LE/IC authority with higher security levels, and  
 Level 1 “RED” will only send a general alert with request for information 
that will be given only to authorized personnel with the appropriate 
security clearance. 
The project definition stage also requires that key project stakeholders be 
identified. The assumption made for this work is that the FBI is the logical body to 
govern and manage the networked facial recognition system that will be developed. 
Currently, CJIS manages the largest biometric repository with its IAFIS system. The 
proposed facial recognition system can be thought of as a conceptually similar 
identification system. The experience CJIS has with executing, managing, and 
maintaining the IAFIS system is applicable to the proposed system. In addition to the 
FBI, state and local LE officials are also likely stakeholders as they will ultimately be the 
end users of the system. A working group comprised of members of this community 
should be created to represent the requirements and interests of these stakeholders to 
ensure their needs are met.  
Funding sources must also be identified in the project definition phase. While 
funding is a requirement for all acquisitions and the source of money will have to be 
identified, the selection of an appropriate or available source of funding is out of the 





 Alternatives: During the project definition phase we also must identify 
alternatives to the components of the proposed project.  
 Constraints: Finally, project constraints must be defined. Project 
constraints can be defined along with project requirements. Work must be 
done with project stakeholders to define not only what is included in the 
project, but what is not included, and how to handle system errors. For 
example, system constraints would include how to handle network or 
recognition server outages. 
3. Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis is completed in each spiral, before the prototypes are developed. For 
the proposed project, legal, and social analysis must be conducted to ensure privacy 
rights are protected and to understand the likelihood of public acceptance. Risk of 
network compromise will be analyzed. Other risks identified in this architecture for 
consideration are hardware and software compatibility, the speed of throughput, the 
format of data and images, the latency of delivery, and the rate of technology refresh. 
Stakeholders may have different requirements, and this difference will pose program 
risks as well. As with each spiral, risks these will be refined, addressed, and adjudicated. 
4. Conceptual Prototyping 
The first way to take any idea and make it reality is to illustrate and diagram the 
approach as well as to review various scenarios. We will prototype our approach by 
starting with the bare essentials that will be needed to achieve results. Furthermore, we 
will need a diagram interconnecting a facial recognition database residing behind a secure 
firewall to live video streaming via the Internet. Then, the information from videos would 
have to be indexed against information related to a POI. The positive results will be sent 
via secure metafile to the end user. Illustrating every step of the way will allow the design 
team to see if the architecture makes sense. Conceptual prototyping allows for the 
visualization of problems as they arise, which is critical in the design process. Error! 
Reference source not found. incorporates the assumptions outlined in the project 






Figure 15.  Conceptual Prototype 
5. Concept of Operation Development / System Software and Hardware 
Specification 
The fundamental backbone of this concept is a robust, fast, and redundant 
automated biometrics facial recognition server. Facial Recognition Systems, illustrated at 
a high level in Figure 15, automatically identifies a person from an image or video frame. 
This identification is accomplished by comparing features extracted from the image and 
comparing against those stored in a database. The steps typically involved in the systems 
are as follows: 
 Image capture: Still photographs or frames extracted from live video 
cameras are used as inputs to the facial recognition system. 
 Detection: A face detection system processes the image to determine if a 
face is present in the captured scene. Those images, or frames for which a 
face was detected are passed along to the next stage of processing. 
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 Acceptability testing: Detected faces are further processed to determine if 
they are acceptable for further processing. For example, most facial 
recognition systems require a minimum image resolution and minimal 
angles of alignment with the camera to accurately perform a match.  
 Measurement/matching: Measurements of the facial features of the images 
are computed, and these measurements are statistically compared to those 
stored in the database index. Matches and their scores are returned.  
The algorithms associated with state of the art facial recognition systems continue 
to evolve, taking into account specific measurements such as skin texture. This evolution 
continues to improve the accuracy of these systems, which makes them viable for use in 
CONOPS such as described in this work.  
 
Figure 16.  Facial Recognition System (after Anthony, 2014) 
The design of the server will go through various developmental spirals, but we 
will need a software base with an open architecture to work from. Data storage, indexing 
speeds, and redundant systems will be identified. Biometrics software, operating system 
software, computer interface, Internet connections, and hardware will be defined.  
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The facial recognition system can be implemented by integrating two 
commercially available products: Progeny SPOTR and TAVI. The integration of these 
two systems will enhance the overall system performance as they utilize different 
underlying recognition technologies. As of this writing, the author was involved in 
program managing the Progeny system and TAVI system through Office of Naval 
Research. During the 20 months of involvement (between 2009 and 2011) with each 
system, the author had the opportunity to demonstrate and test each concept at TNT 
Camp Roberts and at Empire Challenge 2010 at Ft. Huachuca military base in Arizona. 
The Progeny Surveillance, Persistent Observation and Target Recognition 
(SPOTR) system utilizes algorithms and techniques that enable object detection and 
tracking at long range by using standard consumer optics. As compared to traditional 
methods, the increased range allows improved surveillance of non-cooperative 
individuals. This range is a key feature as of this proposal is for the use of currently 
available, low resolution video and camera systems, such as live Internet video feeds at 
popular locations, general surveillance cameras, and security cameras set up for special 
events. A successful demonstration of the capability took place at the Empire Challenge 
in Ft. Huachuca, Arizona.  
The Tactical Analysis of Video Imaging (TAVI) system provides automated 
analysis of surveillance video. System capabilities of interest to this work include face 
recognition a distances greater than 100m and automatic alerting of security threat events. 
The system is scalable and adaptable for various mission needs ranging from trailer-based 
command centers to Android phone-based systems. The integration of the Progeny and 
TAVI technologies with the proposed network and centralized POI database would 
provide a robust and adaptable solution to identifying persons of interest in near real-
time.  
Another requirement is for the CJIS to have the ability to receive streaming live 
video, process the image real-time through a facial recognition server, and then send an 
alert in a universal metadata format as required by LE agencies. The alert would have 
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security protocols in one of three levels, Level 3 “GREEN,” Level 2 “YELLOW” and 
Level 1 “RED” as previously detailed (also see Figure 17). 
 
 
Figure 17.  Concept of Operations (after Mayo, 2011) 
6. Engineering and Project Planning 
Engineering and project planning is essential to ensure all concepts presented are 
functional and realistic. A project timeline must be thought out and documented. 
Working groups will be identified for each subsystem. The following project planning 
questions will be answered.  
 How long will this project take from inception to delivery?  
 How many prototypes are required before maturity? Where is the funding?  




The answers to these questions will identify a preliminary schedule to be used in 
development. 
As mentioned previously, part of the requirements phase will identify the 
stakeholders, and we have postulated the FBI as the main stakeholder. Having identified 
a major stakeholder, we can enumerate other steps that would have to take place, such as: 
developing a pilot program to include testing and acceptance, management, risk 
management, quality control, and the assembly of working groups. Furthermore, lessons 
learned would be identified at the conclusion of the pilot phase and based on the 
outcome. Final preparations would then be made, and cost, technical, and schedule 
considerations would be formulated. 
7. System Review: Milestone 
At this stage, the entire spiral development completed to date is reviewed; the 
outcomes will serve as inputs the next spiral development. All high-risk items are 
identified and addressed. According to Boehm, the spiral model envisions iterative 
development as a repeating sequence of steps. Instead of traversing a sequence of 
analysis, modeling, development, integration, and test just once, software may return over 
and over to each (Maier, 2009). The system review milestone will pull together the 
project stakeholders and review the project definition, discuss the risk analysis, review 
the conceptual prototype, review the concept of operations, and the preliminary 
engineering and project plan. 
B. SUMMARY 
A system of systems approach, which features interoperability, is brought forward 
for consideration in developing this CONOPS based on the identified capability gap. The 
spiral model, created by Boehm and enhanced by Langford, provides the attention to 
detail and refinement needed to implement current systems to enhance LE / IC ability to 
protect national security. The spiral development of this CONOPS will ensure a mature 
and robust system of systems that can act to identify a POI from live active video 
streaming from the Internet and match it against active enrollments residing on a secure 
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LE / IC database. Once a match is found, a secure common metadata file is sent to the 
appropriate regional LE /IC for further action. Providing real-time monitoring will 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
By their nature, passive systems require a significant criminal or terrorist event to 
occur before they are used to find and identify a POI. Active systems that proactively 
monitor real-time information feeds could significantly improve security by alerting the 
LE and IC authorities of the presence of a POI before a crime occurs. While currently 
both federal and state law enforcement agencies utilize facial recognition technologies to 
identify a person of interest, these are passive systems that require a request from LE 
authorities to initiate a search. Additional delays are incurred when multiple requests are 
needed to search databases that are owned by different government agencies. This 
increases the time it takes to obtain an actionable match. While there is an ongoing effort 
to upgrade and consolidate data sharing between federal and state law enforcement 
agencies, which would address the information flow of data, official requests must still be 
made to initiate a search. 
This word proposes a proactive, real-time augmentation to the current approach; it 
has the capability of identifying a POI before a threat to national security arises. In 
addition, by eliminating the formal request process, this proposed capability also 
significantly reduces the time it takes to identify a POI and enable further investigation. 
Finally, this type of system can be used to provide additional data, such as patterns of 
movement of POI to IC investigations. The concept of operations presented in this thesis 
will significantly enhance current LE / IC capabilities. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The concept of operation presented in this thesis can be developed in accordance 
with the spiral model as presented previously for initial prototyping by utilizing available 
facial recognition systems to identify a person of interest using low resolution live video 
streaming from an identified publicly accessible webcam. More research is needed to 
define resolution requirements to make a positive match to a photograph residing on a 
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biometric server. Another research opportunity would be to determine if a POI traveling 
in a vehicle could be identified via installed DOT traffic cameras. It would be necessary 
to conduct a detailed risk analysis to ensure each development milestone achieves a more 
refined system. The mitigation of latency issues derived from live video websites is 
another area for research. A more complete analysis is required to see if a facial 
recognition server could accurately and effectively scan multiple live video feeds 




APPENDIX DNI COMMUNITY MEMBERS 
Appendix A provides a summary description for each of the members of the 
Intelligence community. These descriptions are provided verbatim from the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) website (Office of the Directory of National 
Intelligence, 2012).  
A. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF 
INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS 
The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for using information and 
intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the 
United States. DHS Intelligence focuses on five principal areas: improving the quality 
and quantity of its analysis, integrating the intelligence elements of the department, 
sharing threat information and assessments with state and local governments and the 
private sector (Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2012b).  
B. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
BRANCH 
The National Security Branch (NSB) was established on September 12, 2005 in 
response to a presidential directive to establish a “National Security Service” that 
combines the missions, capabilities, and resources of the counterterrorism, 
counterintelligence, and intelligence elements of the FBI under the leadership of a senior 
FBI official. The NSB strengthens the integration of the FBI’s intelligence and 
investigative missions. Information collected through FBI investigations is analyzed, not 
just to build a case for prosecution, but for its predictive value. In turn, intelligence drives 
investigative strategies. In July 2006, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate was 
created within the NSB to integrate WMD components previously spread throughout the 
FBI (FBI, 2012d).  
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C. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a Department of Defense combat 
support agency and an important member of the United States Intelligence community. 
With over 12,000 military and civilian employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer 
and manager of foreign military intelligence. It provides military intelligence to 
warfighters, defense policymakers and force planners in the both Department of Defense 
and the Intelligence community in support of U.S. military planning and operations and 
weapon systems acquisition (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2012). 
D. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is an independent agency responsible for 
providing national security intelligence to senior U.S. policymakers (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2012). 
E. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE 
The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is the 
nation’s cryptologic organization that coordinates, directs, and performs highly 
specialized activities to protect U.S. information systems and to produce foreign signals 
intelligence information. A high-technology organization, NSA is at the forefront of 
communications and information technology (National Security Agency, 2012). 
F. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 
The Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) is responsible for providing 
drug-related information responsive to IC requirements. DEA/ONSI establishes and 
manages centralized tasking of requests for and analysis of national security information 




G. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & 
ANALYSIS 
The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) was established by the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for FY2004. The act specifies that OIA shall be responsible for the 
receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and foreign 
counterintelligence information related to the operation and responsibilities of the 
Department of the Treasury (Office of Intelligence & Analysis, 2012a).  
H. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & 
RESEARCH 
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) provides the Secretary of State 
with timely, objective analysis of global developments as well as real-time insights from 
all-source intelligence. It serves as the focal point within the Department of State for all 
policy issues and activities involving the intelligence community (U.S. Department of 
State, 2012).  
I. NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) provides timely, relevant, 
and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security objectives. 
Information collected and processed by NGA is tailored for customer-specific solutions 
(National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 2012). 
J. NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) designs, builds and operates the 
nation’s reconnaissance satellites. NRO products, which are provided to an expanding list 
of customers like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense 
(DOD), can warn of potential trouble spots around the world, help plan military 
operations, and monitor the environment (National Reconnaissance Office, 2012). 
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K. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence provides the secretary, staff, 
and other policymakers within the department timely, technical intelligence analyses on 
all aspects of foreign nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and energy issues worldwide 
(Department of Energy, 2012).  
L. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 
Air Force Intelligence plays a critical role in the defense of our nation, providing 
aerial reconnaissance and surveillance in every conflict and contingency operation since 
its establishment as a separate service in 1947. Air Force aerial reconnaissance and 
surveillance began with open cockpits and observers drawing crude maps as they flew 
and rapidly advanced to photographic reconnaissance being taken from converted fighter 
and bomber aircraft (United States Air Force, 2012). 
M. UNITED STATES ARMY 
The U.S. Army Intelligence department (G2) is responsible for policy 
formulation, planning, programming, budgeting, management, staff supervision, 
evaluation, and oversight for intelligence activities for the Department of the Army. The 
G2 is responsible for the overall coordination of the five major military intelligence (MI) 
disciplines within the Army: imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, human 
intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and counterintelligence and security 
countermeasures (United States Army, 2012). 
N. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 
Within the Marine Corps, intelligence is an inherent component of the command 
decision-making process. Under Marine Corps doctrine, intelligence is considered the 
foundation on which the operational effort is built and the premise on which all training, 




provide commanders at every level with seamless, tailored, timely, and mission-essential 
intelligence and to ensure this intelligence is integrated into the operational planning 
process (United States Marine Corps, 2012). 
O. UNITED STATES NAVY 
Established on March 23, 1882, Naval Intelligence is the oldest continuous 
serving U.S. intelligence service. It is a global intelligence enterprise of over 20,000 
uniformed and civilian personnel. The Naval Intelligence primary production 
organization, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), located at the National Maritime 
Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO) in Suitland, Maryland, is the lead Department of 
Defense production center for maritime intelligence. ONI supports a variety of missions 
including U.S. military acquisition and development, counter-terrorism, counter-
proliferation, counter-narcotics, customs enforcement and, through partnerships and 
information sharing agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Northern Command, 
Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. While ONI is the largest Naval Intelligence 
organization with the largest concentration of Naval Intelligence civilians, most of Naval 
Intelligence is comprises active duty military personnel, who are serving throughout the 
world (United States Navy, 2012).  
P. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
The Coast Guard’s broad responsibilities include protecting citizens from the sea 
(maritime safety), protecting America from threats delivered by the sea (maritime 
security), and protecting the sea itself (maritime stewardship). The Coast Guard’s 
persistent presence in the maritime domain, due to its diverse mission sets and broad 
legal authorities, allows it to fill a unique niche within the Intelligence community. 
Because of its unique access, emphasis, and expertise in the maritime domain Coast 
Guard Intelligence can collect and report intelligence that not only supports Coast Guard 
missions, but also supports national objectives. Coast Guard Intelligence strives to create 




relevant intelligence to shape Coast Guard operations, planning, and decision-making, 
and to support national and homeland security intelligence requirements (United States 
Coast Guard, 2012). 
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